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JOB SECURITY, MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVES, AND FIRST
NATIONAL MAINTENANCE
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, in First National Maintenance v.
NLRB,1 held that an employer's decision to shut down part of its
operation for purely economic reasons was not a mandatory subject
of bargaining under section 8(d) of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act.2 This is the Court's latest pronouncement on decision-
bargaining.3
The labor-management confrontation in First National Main-
tenance occurred because Congress deliberately left open the list
of subjects over which management and the employees' representa-
tive must bargain.4 Although the content of the list of mandatory
1. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
2. Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.c. §§
158(a)(1) and 158(d) (1976), combine to require the employer and the employees' represen-
tative "[t]o meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment."
3. "Decision-bargaining" refers to an employer bargaining with his employees' repre-
sentative prior to the implementation of a managerial decision which will have an immedi-
ate adverse effect on unit employment. An employer is free to implement the desired change
after bargaining. During decision-bargaining, however, the employer's decision is theoreti-
cally not final. Unions traditionally have sought bargaining over management decisions in-
volving automation, subcontracting, relocations, partial closings, and sale or termination of
the buiness. See R. GoRuN, LABoR LAW 509-23 (1976).
Decision-bargaining differs from "effects" or "impact" bargaining. When effects bargain-
ing alone is required, the employer's decision is presumed final, but the parties bargain over
the effects to flow from the decision. Topics discussed include severance pay, seniority and
pensions, and transfer rights. See NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933
(9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
4. When enacting the Taft-Hartley Amendment to the National Labor Relations Act in
1947, Congress rejected the proposal which would have expressly limited the subjects of
bargaining to:
(i) [w]ages, hours of employment, and work requirements; (ii) procedures and
practices relating to discharge, suspension, lay-off, recall, seniority, and disci-
pline, or to promotion, demotion, transfer and assignment within the bargaining
unit; (iii) conditions, procedures, and practices governing safety, sanition, and
protection of health at the place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of
absence; and (v) administrative and procedural provisions relating to the forego-
ing subjects.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947). The House Minority Report expressed the
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bargaining subjects which section 8(d) envisions is unclear, the Su-
preme Court has determined that the statute did, in fact, create a
finite set of subjects over which bargaining is mandatory.5 Unfortu-
nately, however, the Court has never furnished objective criteria
for distinguishing mandatory subjects from non-mandatory ones.'
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the courts
have traditionally given meaning to ambiguous provisions of fed-
eral labor legislation by balancing the respective interests of em-
ployers and employees in an effort to achieve an interpretation
which furthers federal labor law's stated purpose of maintaining
"industrial peace."'7 When a management decision, such as the par-
intent that § 8(d) be left open to future interpretation by the Board and the courts.
The appropriate scope of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a
formula; it will inevitably depend upon the traditions of the industry, the social
and political climate at any given time, the needs of employers and employees,
and many related factors.. . . What are proper subjects of collective bargaining
should be left in the first instance to employers and trade-unions, and in the
second place, to any administrative agency skilled in the field and competent to
devote the necessary time to a study of the industry or area of the country,
subject to the review by the courts. It cannot and should not be strait-jacketed
by legislative enactment.
H.R. REP. No. 245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, at 362 (1948) (Minority Report).
5. NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). In Borg-
Warner, the Supreme Court acknowledged that labor and management may discuss and
arrive at binding agreements regarding any legal subject. The Court went on, however, to
hold that a party may not insist to the point of impasse on a proposal that is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Further, a party may refuse to discuss a non-mandatory
subject. Once a specific subject has been classified as mandatory, however, the parties are
required to bargain over the subject if it has been proposed for discussion by either party.
Thereafter, neither party may take unilateral action on the subject until an impasse in the
negotiations. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d
803 (1974). See also NLRB v. W.R. Grace & Co., 571 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1978).
6. In Borg-Warner, for example, the Court went no further than deciding that the pre-
strike ballot clause and the recognition clause desired by the company were not within the
meaning of the phrase "other terms and conditions of employment." 356 U.S. at 343.
7. For a statement of the goal of maintaining industrial peace, see NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For two examples of the Supreme Court interpret-
ing the Act by balancing the respective interests of employers and employees, see NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) and John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543 (1964). In Babcock & Wilcox, the Court balanced the employers' property rights against
the employees' organizational rights: "Organization rights are granted to workers by the
same authority, the National Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation
between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other." 351 U.S. at 112. The Court has also used interest balancing as
the means to determine whether an arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agree-
ment survived a merger so as to be operative against the successor corporation. In John
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tial closing in First National Maintenance, improves the economic
performance of the enterprise through the termination of existing
employees, the employer's interest in freely operating the business
directly conflicts with the employees' interest in a secure job. The
Supreme Court first acknowledged the employees' interest in job
security by refusing to enjoin a strike for a contract clause which
would have required union consent prior to the elimination of unit
jobs on the ground that such a strike constituted a "labor dis-
pute."" The employer's interest in freely managing the business
has been accepted as fundamental in many decisions by both the
Board and the courts.9 Accordingly, courts have balanced job se-
curity against managerial freedom to decide whether "industrial
peace" would be furthered more effectively by submitting a deci-
sion which results in termination of employment to the collective
bargaining process or by labelling it a managerial prerogative be-
yond the reach of mandatory bargaining.10
Unfortunately, balancing job security against managerial free-
dom cannot produce objective solutions to decision-bargaining
cases, because these interests are incapable of being objectively
weighed and compared."' The reviewing court must initially deter-
mine the weight and significance to be accorded these unquantifi-
able interests, and this determination is necessarily conclusive of
the final decision. The respective weights accorded job security and
Wiley & Sons, the Court explained: "The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in
established principles of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners inde-
pendently to rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be bal-
anced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment rela-
tionship." 367 U.S. at 549.
8. See Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). In
Railroad Telegraphers, the Court declined to enjoin the strike, because it determined that
the strike was a "labor dispute" within § 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 29 U.S.C. §
113(c) (1976).
9. In Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), the Supreme Court
stated that "some management decisions are so peculiarly matters of management preroga-
tive that they would never constitute violations of § 8(a)(1)." Id. at 269.
10. See Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 722, 740 (3d Cir. 1978). See
also infra text accompanying note 74.
11. The subjectivity involved in balancing the respective interests of employers and em-
ployees was recognized early in the history of labor law litigation. In Vegelahn v. Guntner,
167 Mass. 92 (1896), Justice Holmes (then sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Court)
stated: "The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social advantage,
and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic and the general
propositions of law which nobody disputes." Id. at 106 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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managerial freedom depend on whether a court balances these in-
terests with a view toward advancing free enterprise or industrial
democracy. 12 In First National Maintenance, the Supreme Court
suggests that federal labor legislation should be interpreted against
a background in which free enterprise is the paramount value.
This Comment maintains that, given the significance accorded
free enterprise in the Court's conception of labor law, mandatory
decision-bargaining should become the rare exception, not a pro-
cess required whenever management contemplates a decision
which adversely affects unit employment. Since free enterprise is
the traditional foundation of our economic system, the high regard
for managerial freedom expressed in First National Maintenance
is appropriate in the absence of explicit congressional guidance."3
Setting the parameters of mandatory decision-bargaining requires
both social and economic value judgments. 14 This type of decision
making is a legislative, not judicial, function.1 5 This Comment ac-
knowledges, however, that Congress has declined to legislate as to
the scope of an employer's duty to decision-bargain and that the
Supreme Court has expressly refused to extend its holding in First
National Maintenance beyond partial closings.16 As a conse-
quence, and since the NLRB's general counsel presently maintains
that most managerial decisions on which there has been no express
Supreme Court guidance are mandatory subjects of bargaining,"
the controversy surrounding decision-bargaining will continue.
I. FIBREBOARD: THE ROOT OF DECISION-BARGAINING
A. The National Labor Relations Board Decision
Early NLRB decisions did not find mandatory bargaining over
major management decisions, such as automation, relocation, and
partial closing, to be implicit in the language of section 8(d). Ac-
12. "Industrial Democracy" refers to the doctrine that workers should participate in
company decisions that "control their working lives." Summers, Industrial Democracy:
America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 29 (1979).
13. See infra notes 118 & 122.
14. See Brockway Motor Trucks, 582 F.2d at 722. See also infra note 114.
15. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963); Kealey Pharmacy & Home
Care Serv., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 539 F. Supp. 1357, 1369 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
16. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
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cordingly, in Fibreboard I,"" the Board held that a company could
terminate fifty in-plant maintenance workers and hire independent
contractors to perform their work without bargaining over the de-
cision. The Board's holding was fairly straightforward: "[T]he es-
tablishment by the Board of an appropriate unit does not preclude
an employer acting in good faith from making changes in his busi-
ness structure, such as entering into subcontracting arrangements,
without first consulting the representative, of the affected employ-
ees."19 The Board's rationale was that its own precedent only re-
quired bargaining over the impact of a decision which leads to ter-
mination of employment20 and that nothing in the statutory
language supported the inference that Congress intended to re-
quire bargaining over basic management decisions. 1
While nothing in section 8(d) expressly required mandatory
bargaining over economically motivated subcontracting decisions,
neither did the statutory language expressly preclude the imposi-
tion of mandatory bargaining as a precondition to management de-
cisions such as subcontracting. Thus, on reconsideration in
Fibreboard 1I,22 the Board reversed its position and held that the
refusal to bargain over economically motivated subcontracting de-
cisions was an unfair labor practice.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,23 the Supreme
Court affirmed the Board's decision in Fibreboard II and thereby
set the background for the labor-management confrontation in
First National Maintenance. The scope of the Supreme Court's
decision in Fibreboard was narrow. It required only that an em-
ployer bargain over a decision to replace employees in an existing
bargaining unit with "independent contractors [who would per-
form] the same work under similar conditions of employment.
'2 4
The reasoning which supported the decision, however, would have
18. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961).
19. Id. at 1560 (footnotes omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1561. The Board perceived "basic management decisions" as decisions con-
cerning "whether and to what extent to risk capital and managerial effect." Id.
22. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
23. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
24. Id. at 215.
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far reaching implications regarding the freedom of an employer to
implement economic decisions which cause an immediate reduc-
tion in the workforce.
The Court began its analysis in Fibreboard by recognizing the
employees' interest in job security. It stated:
The subject matter of the present dispute is well within the literal meaning of
the phrase "terms and conditions of employment." See Order of Railroad Te-
legraphers v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co .... A stipulation with respect to con-
tracting out of work performed by members of the bargaining unit might ap-
propriately be called a "condition of employment." The words even more
plainly cover termination of employment which, as the facts of this case indi-
cate, necessarily results from the contracting out of work performed by mem-
bers of the established bargaining unit.2 5
The precise meaning of this passage is controversial, as it is subject
to more than one interpretation. 26 Regardless of its exact meaning,
25. Id. at 210 (citations omitted).
26. The confusion arises because two very different glosses have been put on this para-
graph. The first is Justice Stewart's concurring opinion which stressed that the Court's deci-
sion must be read narrowly. Justice Stewart stated:
While employment security has thus been properly recognized in various circum-
stances as a condition of employment, it surely does not follow that every deci-
sion which may affect job security is a subject of compulsory collective bargain-
ing .... Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a
duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the
core of entrepreneurial control.
379 U.S. at 223. In contrast to Justice Stewart's statements, the Court referred to Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960), which involved an at-
tempt by the union to obtain job security rights far more restrictive of managerial freedom
than decision-bargaining. In Railroad Telegraphers, the union struck for a clause which
would have made union consent a prerequisite to the elimination of unit jobs. In reaching its
decision not to enjoin this strike, the Court noted:
Plainly the controversy here related to an effort on the part of the union to
change the "terms" of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The change
desired just as plainly referred to "conditions of employment" of the railroad's
employees who are represented by the union. The employment of many of these
station agents inescapably hangs on the number of railroad stations that will be
either completely abandoned or consolidated with other stations. And, in the
collective bargaining world today, there is nothing strange about agreements
that affect the permanency of employment.. . . We cannot agree with the Court
of Appeals that the union's effort to negotiate about the job security of its mem-
bers "represents an attempt to usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the
exercise of business judgment with respect to the most economical and efficient
conduct of its operations."
362 U.S. at 336.
The broad job security interest recognized in Railroad Telegraphers and the citation of
that case by the Fibreboard Court has led some courts to conclude that management deci-
sions which result in immediate termination of unit employment are prima facie mandatory
1982] FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE 515
however, the Court, at a minimum, recognized that job security is a
legitimate concern of unions and thus was willing to consider
whether mandatory decision-bargaining was desirable in the cir-
cumstances of that case.
Since the Court clearly did not intend to make every decision
which decreases the number of available jobs a mandatory subject
of bargaining,27 it had to explain why the particular subcontracting
decision in Fibreboard should be deemed a mandatory subject of
bargaining. Three reasons were offered in support of its decision.
First, the Court noted that "industrial experience" indicated that
-subcontracting decisions were amenable to the collective bargain-
ing process. 28 Second, since high labor costs prompted the com-
pany's decision, the Court believed that collective bargaining
might easily produce a solution which would be satisfactory to
subjects of bargaining. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. The underlying assump-
tion in Railroad Telegraphers, that employees have the right to prevent the elimination of
their jobs, is not unanimously accepted today. See generally Comment, Partial Termina-
tions-A Choice Between Bargaining Equality and Economic Efficiency, 14 UCLA L. REv.
1089 (1967). Indeed, the Railroad Telegraphers opinion was endorsed by only five justices,
with four dissenters. The Supreme Court in First Nat'l Maintenance avoided discussing the
continuing validity of Railroad Telegraphers by stating that it concerned the scope of bar-
gaining under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976), and, therefore, was not deter-
minative of cases arising under the NLRA. See 452 U.S. at 686, 687 n.23. The Supreme
Court's refusal to interject the job security rights espoused in Railroad Telegraphers into
the NLRA, however, is further justified by the questionable reasoning of the majority in
that case. Cf. Railroad Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 345-64 (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (Whitta-
ker, J. was joined by Frankfurter, Clark, and Stewart, JJ.) (Congress did not envision that
the number of existing railroad jobs would be frozen).
27. We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to hold as we
do now, that the type of "contracting out" involved in this case-the replace-
ment of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent
contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment-is a
statutory subject of bargaining under § 8(d). Our decision does not and need not
encompass other forms of "contracting out" or "subcontracting" which arise
daily in our complex economy.
379 U.S. at 215.
Justice Stewart, concurring, stated: "Decisions concerning the volume and kind of adver-
tising expenditures, product design, the manner of financing, and sales, all may bear upon
security of the workers' jobs. Yet it is hardly conceivable that such decisions so involve
'conditions of employment' that they must be negotiated with employees' bargaining repre-
sentative." Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
28. The Court cited Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, Pts. 1 & 2,
84 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 579, 715 (1961) as support for this proposition. 379 U.S. at 211 n.6.
The Lunden survey indicated that approximately one-fourth of the collective bargaining
agreements studied had some sort of limitations on subcontracting. Id. at 212 n.7.
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both parties.2" Finally, the Court observed that the "facts of the
case" indicated that bargaining over this type of subcontracting
decision would not significantly abridge management's freedom to
run the business."0
The Fibreboard opinion also addressed the company's argu-
ment that management should not have to negotiate for potential
cost savings when subcontracting would achieve definite cost re-
ductions. The company attempted to support this argument by
pointing out that prior negotiations with the union had been una-
ble to produce the desired savings. The Court replied simply: "The
short answer is that, although it is not possible to say whether a
satisfactory solution could be reached, national labor policy is
founded upon the congressional determination that the chances are
good enough to warrant subjecting such issues to the process of
collective negotiation."31 The Supreme Court made this statement
in the context of merely affording Fibreboard's maintenance em-
ployees the opportunity to match the cost reductions which the in-
dependent contractors offered. However, the general tone of the
Court's language suggested that it had application outside the facts
of the case.
32
The Fibreboard opinion contained a group of generalizations
which could be applied outside of the context of subcontracting
29. The company was concerned with the high cost of its maintenance operation.
It was induced to contract out the work by assurances from independent con-
tractors that economies could be derived by reducing the work force, decreasing
fringe benefits, and eliminating overtime payments. These have long been re-
garded as matters peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargain-
ing framework, and industrial experience demonstrates that collective negotia-
tion has been highly successful in achieving peaceful accommodation of the
conflicting interests.
Id. at 213-14.
30. Id. at 213. The "facts" which suggested that decision-bargaining would be appropri-
ate were:
The Company's decision to contract out the maintenance work did not alter the
Company's basic operation. The maintenance work still had to be performed in
the plant. No capital investment was contemplated; the Company merely re-
placed existing employees with those of an independent contractor to do the
same work under similar conditions of employment.
Id.
31. Id. at 214.
32. In First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), the court of
appeals used Fibreboard's "short answer" to reject the company's argument for a per se no-
bargaining rule for partial closing decisions. Id. at 601.
[Vol. 31
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decision-bargaining.33 Moreover, Fibreboard was the only Supreme
Couit decision on decision-bargaining. Accordingly, even though
Fibreboard was expressly limited to its facts, 4 the application of
its rationale to other management decisions by the NLRB and
lower courts was inevitable. Recognizing the broad implications in-
herent in Fibreboard and the danger it would be applied to other
management decisions,3 5 Justice Stewart wrote a concurring opin-
ion to emphasize the extremely limited nature of the decision.36
II. EXPANSION OF THE FIBREBOARD RATIONALE TO PARTIAL
CLOSINGS
As Justice Stewart had anticipated, Fibreboard did not remain
limited to its facts. The Board read Fibreboard as recognizing that
employees have an interest in the continued availability of their
jobs and, therefore, that employers are not free to cut costs
through the elimination of jobs without first providing the union
the opportunity to make suggestions or concessions.3 7 Thus, in
Ozark Trailers, Inc.,35 the Board held that an employer had an
obligation to bargain over a partial closing decision which was
prompted by operating inefficiencies. The Board specifically re-
jected the argument that an employer need not bargain over an
economically motivated partial closing because it is a major deci-
sion which is basic to the scope of the enterprise and involves a
capital commitment decision. It reasoned:
For, just as the employer has invested capital in the business, so the em-
ployee has invested years of his working life, accumulating seniority, accruing
pension rights, and developing skills which may or may not be saleable to
another employer. And, just as the employer's interest in the protection of his
33. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 27 & 30.
35. "[T]he Court's opinion today radiated implications of such disturbing breadth that
I am persuaded to file this separate statement of my own views." 379 U.S. at 218 (Stewart,
J., concurring, joined by Douglas & Harlan, JJ.) (Goldberg, J. took no part in the
Fibreboard decision).
36. Justice Stewart's most oft-quoted suggested limitation of the Court's holding is,
"Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collec-
tively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control."
Id. at 223.
37. This interpretation of Fibreboard was based primarily on the Court's remark, "The
words even more plainly cover termination of employment." See Rabin, The Decline and
Fall of Fibreboard, N.Y.U. TWENTY-FouRTH CONT. ON LAB. 237, 245 (1972).
38. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
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capital investment is entitled to consideration in our interpretation of the
Act, so too is the employee's interest in the protection of his livelihood."
Ozark Trailers was a very liberal interpretation of Fibreboard,
an interpretation which the circuit courts were not quick to em-
brace. In NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing,'40 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit held that "an employer faced with the
economic necessity of either moving or consolidating the opera-
tions of a failing business has no duty to bargain with the union
respecting its decision to shut down."' 42 The court distinguished
Fibreboard on the ground -that the partial closing before it in-
volved "a management decision to recommit and reinvest funds in
the business. 42 Similarly, in NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc.,5 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found no duty to bargain
over the decision to terminate company truckdrivers and adopt a
distribution system in which independent driver-salesmen would
buy the milk and then distribute it to their own customers. Here
the court discounted Fibreboard because Adams Dairy instituted
"a basic operational change.., when the dairy decided to com-
pletely change its existing distribution system by selling its prod-
ucts to independent contractors."
4
Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB 45 was the pivotal pro-labor
case for partial closing decision-bargaining. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit refused to rely on Royal Plating and Polish-
ing"6 as dispositive precedent and drew on the rationale of
Fibreboard in an effort to analyze the partial closing decision-bar-
gaining question anew.
47
39. Id. at 566.
40. 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965).
41. Id. at 196.
42. Id.
43. 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
44. Id. at 111.
45. 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
47. Judge Rosenn argued, in dissent, that Royal Plating & Polishing should not be
disregarded:
I believe that the stipulation in this case, that the closing of the Philadelphia
facility was solely for economic reasons, puts this case within the four corners of
Royal Plating. The majority, however, endeavor to distinguish the instant case
from Royal Plating on the ground that the decision to close in the latter came
only after prolonged severe economic loss and a threatened condemnation of the
land on which the plant was located.. . . In my view this distinction cannot be
drawn validly from the reasoning of Royal Plating.. . . Moreover, the majority
518 [Vol. 31
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The court began its analysis by noting that it was appropriate
to determine whether mandatory decision-bargaining should be ex-
tended to partial closing decisions because these decisions, like the
subcontracting decision in Fibreboard, lead directly to the loss of
jobs.48 After determining that the resulting termination of employ-
ment created a presumption that partial closing decisions are
mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Brockway court found that
the three justifications for subcontracting decision-bargaining
stated in Fibreboard49 applied with sufficient force to partial clos-
ings to warrant submitting these decisions to the collective bar-
gaining process ° Since Fibreboard did not require bargaining over
all types of subcontracting decisions, the Brockway court did not
believe a rule which required bargaining over every partial closing
decision was appropriate. 51 Its final holding, therefore, was that
distinction appears to be no more than a post facto rationalization from the facts
of certain cases to support a novel principle.
582 F.2d at 743-44 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
48. Just as subcontracting is likely to lead to the termination of employment, so,
too, will the closing down of an employer's plant-and thus the latter act "might
appropriately be called a 'condition of employment'." Accordingly, it would seem
that there is an initial presumption, founded on statutory purposes and lan-
guage, that a partial closing is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
582 F.2d at 735. At the foundation of the majority opinion was the following analysis:
[T]here seems to be no justification for drawing any bright line between a partial
closing situation, as to which there is decisional disagreement regarding the duty
to bargain, and the subcontracting situation of Fibreboard, where the Supreme
Court held that there was a duty to bargain. With regard to both matters, bar-
gaining would serve an important statutory function.
Id.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
50. In Fibreboard, the Court determined that industrial experience, the good possibility
for fruitful discussion, and the insignificant burden on managerial freedom which bargaining
would entail indicated that the subcontracting decision should be subject to bargaining. See
supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
The Brockway court offered a Department of Labor study, in which 21.5% of the con-
tracts surveyed were found to contain a clause dealing with the closing or removal of a
plant, as evidence that industrial experience indicated that decision-bargaining may be use-
ful. 582 F.2d at 737. The court satisfied the Fibreboard requirement of "a good possibility
for fruitful discussion" by noting that the union could offer concessions that might alter the
calculation which led to the company's decision, and by citing examples where the union
and employer had combined to save a troubled enterprise. Id. at 736. Finally, it noted that
decision-bargaining would not significantly burden managerial freedom, because all that
bargaining would require was that "the two sides discuss the matter at the bargaining ta-
ble." Id. at 738. The court continued, "Should the parties fail to reach an agreement, Brock-
way could then go ahead with its plan to close the plant." Id.
51. "As such, [per se rules] ignore the guidance of the Supreme Court in Fibreboard,
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there existed an initial presumption that a partial closing decision
is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The employer could, how-
ever, rebut this presumption with evidence that bargaining over
the decision would be fruitless or unfair.52
The Brockway holding rested on two main premises. First, the
court assumed that decision-bargaining is not a significant burden
on managerial freedom. 3 Second, it interpreted Fibreboard to
stand for the precept that management decisions which cause ter-
mination of employment are presumed to be mandatory subjects of
bargaining."
The Brockway premises constitute an overextension of the
Fibreboard rationale. Fibreboard did not require bargaining over
every form of subcontracting. 5 After noting that the subcontract-
ing decision led to termination of employment, the Supreme Court
went on to provide additional reasons it should be a mandatory
subject of bargaining.5 8 The Court observed that the company's de-
cision did not alter its basic operation nor contemplate capital in-
vestment.5 7 The company replaced existing employees with inde-
pendent contractors who were to perform the same job for less
compensation.58 Only after consideration of all the facts did the
Supreme Court conclude that decision-bargaining would not un-
duly restrict managerial freedom.59 The Third Circuit decision in
Brockway, therefore, was undeniably an overly expansive applica-
which by its example counselled a practical, balancing approach to the problem of articulat-
ing the scope of the employer's duty to bargain under the NLRA." 582 F.2d at 732.
52. The court mentioned closings prompted by the action of a third party, such as a
condemnation of the employer's property, as in Royal Plating, or by the dire financial
straits of the company as examples of closings where decision-bargaining would not be re-
quired. Id. at 738. The court did not decide whether Brockway had a duty to decision-
bargain, because Brockway litigated its case on the theory that no economic partial closing
decisions are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Thus, the court did not have access to the
specific facts leading to Brockway's decision to close its Philadelphia plant. Id. at 740.
53. See Brockway, 582 F.2d at 738.
54. Id. at 735.
55. 379 U.S. at 215.
56. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
57. 379 U.S. at 213.
58. See supra note 30.
59. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court refused to grant
certiorari in Adams Dairy v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011
(1966), where the court of appeals distinguished Fibreboard in finding no duty to bargain
over a subcontracting decision. See supra text accompanying notes 43 & 44.
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tion of the rationale of Fibreboard.e
III. FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE: THE END OF EXPANSIVE
APPLICATIONS OF FIBREBOARD
First National Maintenance Corporations' decided to termi-
nate its contract with Greenpark nursing home because it was los-
ing money on the operation.6 2 First National informed the employ-
ees at Greenpark on July 28, 1977 that it would discontinue
operations on August 1.63 The administrative law judge and the
Board, relying on Ozark Trailers, Inc.,4 found that First National
Maintenance had violated its statutory duty to bargain over the
decision to discontinue its Greenpark operations.6 5 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,66 largely adopting the reasoning of
Brockway, held that there is a presumption that partial closing de-
cisions are mandatory subjects of bargaining.6 7 The court stated
that this presumption could be rebutted "by showing that the pur-
poses of the statute would not be furthered by imposition of a duty
to bargain."6 8 Since First National offered no evidence to rebut the
60. Cf. Recent Decisions, Labor Law-National Labor Relations Act, In a Partial
Closing the Interests of the Parties Must be Balanced to Determine Whether the Closing is
a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining-Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720
(3d Cir. 1978), 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 679 (1979) (the Brockway court misapplied the ra-
tionale of Fibreboard).
61. First National Maintenance Corporation provided housekeeping, cleaning, mainte-
nance, and related services to customers in the New York City area. First National received
reimbursement of labor expenses and a fixed management fee in return for its services. The
company hired personnel separately for each contract and did not transfer employees be-
tween operations. 452 U.S. at 668.
62. First National's weekly management fee was reduced from $500 to $250 on Nov-
ember 1, 1976. Operations at Greenpark continued under the reduced fee until August 1,
1977. The company informed Greenpark by telephone on June 30, 1977 that it would end its
Greenpark operation on August 1 if the management fee was not restored to $500. Id. at
688-89.
63. Id. at 669.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 38 & 39.
65. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979).
66. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 601.
68. Id. This portion of the court's opinion was perceived to be a departure from
Brockway:
[W]e disagree with Brockway that a determinative factor should be a balancing
of the respective interests of the employer and the employees in bargaining. We
believe that the determination whether to impose a duty to bargain should not
depend on the relative injury to the employer and the employees, but rather on
the relative merits of the arguments put forth as to those classic considerations
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
presumed duty to bargain, other than the assertion that it was los-
ing money at Greenpark, the court enforced the Board's bargaining
and backpay orders.69 Because of the importance of this issue and
the continuing disagreement between and among the Board and
the courts of appeals,7 0 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 1
In First National Maintenance v. NLRB, 72 the Supreme
Court, like the Second and Third Circuits, applied the Fibreboard
rationale to partial closing decisions by balancing employee job se-
curity interests against the employer's interest in freely managing
the business. Unlike the circuit courts, however, it accorded the
employer's interest great deference. The Court stated that
"[m]anagement must be free from the constraints of the bargain-
ing process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable
of whether the purposes of the statute are furthered by a decision to impose a
duty to bargain in a particular case.
Id. This passage does not appear to be a meaningful departure from Brockway. Furthering
industrial peace by striking a balance between business owners' and employees' interests
and rights is a purpose of the Act. See supra note 7. Additionally, it seems difficult to judge
"the relative merits of the arguments put forth" without considering the real life implica-
tions of the arguments. Such consideration would seem to require the examination of the
relative injuries to the parties involved. The fact that the Second Circuit cites clearly irrevo-
cable decisions and economic emergency as situations where the presumption of a duty to
decision-bargain would be rebutted seems to make the claimed departure from Brockway
merely apparent. Compare 627 F.2d at 601 with 582 F.2d at 738.
69. The administrative law judge recommended an order requiring First National to
bargain in good faith regarding its decision to terminate the Greenpark operation and
awarding back pay to the discharged employees from the date of their discharge until the
parties bargained to agreement or impasse, failed to request bargaining within a reasonable
time, or failed to bargain in good faith. The Board adopted these recommendations and
additionally required First National to offer the terminated employees reinstatement to
their former jobs or substantial equivalents, if it agreed to resume its Greenpark operations.
If operations at Greenpark were not resumed, then First National was to offer the dis-
charged employees equivalent positions which were to be made available by the discharge of
subsequently hired employees at other operations if necessary. This was the first remedial
order of the Board in the partial closing decision-bargaining area that was fully enforced by
a circuit court. Prior cases had declined to enforce the Board's bargaining orders, because
decision-bargaining was determined to be "futile" at the time of the reviewing court's deci-
sion. See NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Brock-
way Motor Trucks, 582 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1978); Electrical Prod. Div. of Midland-Ross v.
NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1980); and ABC Trans-Nat'l Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 642
F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1981).
70. For an illustration of the conflict leading to the Court's grant of certiorari, compare
Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) and Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582
F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978) with Adams Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
71. 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
72. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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business. '7' Accordingly, the balancing equation was defined as
follows:
[I]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered decision making, bargain-
ing over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the contin-
ued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for la-
bor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs
the burden placed on the conduct of business. 74
The Supreme Court identified the employer's interest as the "need
for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting opportunities and exi-
gencies. '7 5 It further elaborated on this interest by stating:
[The company] may face significant tax or securities consequences that hinge
on confidentiality of a plant closing, or a reorganization of the corporate
structure. The publicity incident to the normal process of bargaining may
injure the possibility of a successful transition or increase the economic dam-
age to the business. 76
In addition, the Court recognized the unnecessary delay which de-
cision-bargaining might cause and the possibility that such delay
might frustrate legitimate management plans and cause unneces-
sary economic damage to the business.
The Court acknowledged the employees' "legitimate concern
over job security"78 and their interest in participating in the partial
closing decision. 9 It concluded, however, that these interests were
not sufficient to justify imposing decision-bargaining on the em-
ployer.80 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted that the
right to effects bargaining "in a meaningful manner and at a mean-
73. Id. at 678-79.
74. Id. at 679. This balancing equation contrasts sharply with the presumption of
mandatory bargaining over decisions which result in termination of employment, adopted in
Brockway. See 582 F.2d at 735.
75. 452 U.S. at 682-83.
76. Id. at 683.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 682.
79. "The union's practical purpose in participating ... will be ... to delay or halt the
closing. No doubt it will be impelled ... to offer concessions, information, and alternatives
that might be helpful to management or forestall or prevent the termination of jobs." Id. at
681-82. The Court acknowledged that unions have actually aided employers in saving failing
businesses. Id. at 681 n.19. However, the Court discounted the importance of union partici-
pation in the decision-making process by stating, "It is unlikely, however, that requiring
bargaining over the decision, as well as its effects, will augment this flow of information and
suggestions." Id. at 681.
80. Id. at 686.
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ingful time ' was adequate protection of the employees' interests.
Further, in situations where union concessions could change the
company's decision, "management will have an incentive to confer
voluntarily with the union.
'8 2
Justice Blackmun determined that the Second Circuit's rebut-
table presumption rule was unacceptable, because an employer
would have difficulty determining when the obligation to decision-
bargain existed.8 3 Thus, the Court did not consider specific facts,
such as the overall financial well-being of First National Mainte-
nance Corporation, when assessing whether the obligation to deci-
sion-bargain existed, but instead analyzed the interests implicated
by partial closing decisions in general.8 4 In doing so, the Court ap-
peared to adopt a per se no-bargaining rule for partial closing deci-
sions. It determined that effects bargaining would provide ade-
quate protection of workers' job security interests5 and further
decided that decision-bargaining would not add significantly to the
protection of these interests, but could conceivably cause signifi-
cant hardship to the employer.86 The holding was as broad as the
Court's analysis:
[W]e conclude that the harm likely to be done to an employer's need to oper-
ate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for
economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained
through the union's participation in the decision, and we hold the decision
itself is not part of section 8(d)'s "terms and conditions." . . . 11
In light of the Court's broad language, its rejection of the re-
buttable presumption analysis, the perceived adequacy of effects
bargaining, and the acknowledgement of the employer's need for
certainty regarding the extent of its bargaining obligations, 8 no
partial closing situation in which decision-bargaining would be
mandatory appears possible. Moreover, the final portion of the
opinion noted that the decision to halt work at Greenpark repre-
sented "a significant change"8 " in operations and that the absence
81. Id. at 682.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 684.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 75-82.
85. 452 U.S. at 682-83.
86. Id.
87. Id. (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 680, 684.
89. Id. at 688.
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of a significant investment commitment or withdrawal of capital is
not determinative. These remarks are further evidence that First
National Maintenance frees employers from mandatory bargain-
ing over economically motivated partial closings decision regardless
of particular fact patterns.
The final portion of the opinion, which purported to illustrate
its limits, is, therefore, most confusing. Here Justice Blackmun
noted that First National "had no intention to replace the dis-
charged employees or move operations elsewhere."' 0 He further ob-
served: "[P]etitioner's dispute with Greenpark was solely over the
management fee Greenpark was willing to pay. The union had no
control or authority over that fee. . . Further, the union was not
selected as the bargaining representative or certified until well af-
ter petitioner's difficulties at Greenpark had begun."91 These facts
could not have influenced the result in First National Mainte-
nance. Replacing employees and moving operations are elements
of subcontracting and relocation, not partial closings. The Court
expressly refused to intimate any views on these management deci-
sions.92 The other facts which Justice Blackmun offered as the lim-
its of the decision seem equally irrelevant in the context of the
remainder of the opinion. Furthermore, if these facts were signifi-
cant to the outcome of the case, then the Court would be adopting
a sometimes-yes-sometimes-no decision-bargaining rule similar to
the rebuttable presumption rule it found "iUsuited."9 Accordingly,
this "limits" section should not weaken the conclusion that em-
ployers have no duty to bargain over an economic partial closing
decision.9
Careful analysis reveals that the Court's reasoning in First
National Maintenance has two major premises. First, decision-
bargaining is a burden on management's freedom to run a profita-
90. Id. at 687.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 686 n.22.
93. Id. at 684.
94. The General Counsel of the NLRB has conceded that First Nat'l Maintenance
most likely established that there is never a duty to bargain over an economic partial clos-
ing. Because of the "limits" section of opinion, however, he has told NLRB regional offices
to be alert for partial closing cases "so different from both the facts and the assumptions
stated in First Nat'l Maintenance that a different result would be warranted." See infra
notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
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ble business.95 Second, termination of employment does not neces-
sarily invoke mandatory decision-bargaining. 96 These premises
conflict with those of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
articulated in Brockway.e7 They are, however, reconcilable with the
Supreme Court decision in Fibreboard9s
IV. THE BURDENS OF DECISION-BARGAINING: INCONSEQUENTIAL
OR INTOLERABLE?
Both Brockway and First National Maintenance accepted the
premise that managerial freedom should not be unduly burdened.
The Third Circuit and the Supreme Court, however, reached oppo-
site conclusions regarding the weight of the burden imposed by
mandatory decision-bargaining. Certain inherent burdens appear
to attach to all instances of decision-bargaining. For example, deci-
sion-bargaining would require numerous and lengthy meetings.99
The duty to bargain in good faith imposes a burdensome obligation
on management to provide information.100 Nebulous concepts such
as "surface bargaining"'' 1 may lead to unfair labor practice charges
and Board intervention that results in unnecessary economic loss
to the business or the frustration of a legitimate business deci-
sion.102 Decision-bargaining would also compel early disclosure of
95. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 53 & 54.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
99. See Rabin, supra note 37, at 260.
100. Id. Cf. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956) ("Good faith bargain-
ing necessarily requires claims made ... be honest claims .... If such an argument is im-
portant enough to be present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to
require some sort of proof of its accuracy."). See also First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at
678-79 n.17.
101. See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1953).
102. The Supreme Court in First Nat'l Maintenance considered unfair labor practice
charges and Board intervention to be tangible burdens associated with decision-bargaining.
See 452 U.S. at 685-86. The validity of raising the possibilities of unfair labor practice
charges and Board intervention as reasons to release an employer from the obligation of
decision-bargaining has been questioned. See Gould, The Supreme Court's Labor and Em-
ployment Docket in the 1980 Term-Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. COLo. L. REV. 1, 11,
13-14 (1981). Despite this scholarly skepticism, the possibility of an employer being injured
by an unfair labor practice charge arising from a decision-bargaining session seems very real.
Cf. Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981) (employer charged
with "surface" effects bargaining and implementing its decision prior to impasse).
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management's intentions,""3 thus damaging the business in terms
of competition, efficiency, and employee morale.04 In addition, the
union, upon learning of management's intentions, may resort to ec-
onomic sanctions in an effort to prevent the impending termina-
tions and thus cause further damange to the business. 105
The weight of the above burdens will inevitably vary from case
to case. Neither the Third Circuit in Brockway nor the Supreme
Court in First National Maintenance, however, considered the
weight of the burden which decision-bargaining would present
within the facts of their particular cases in reaching their respec-
tive decisions.106 It is impossible, therefore, to reconcile Brockway
and First National Maintenance by observing that the burden of
decision-bargaining was less onerous in Brockway than in First
National Maintenance. Rather, the true grounds for decision de-
pend on whether the reviewing court interprets federal labor legis-
lation with a view towards furthering industrial democracy or free
enterprise.
The Brockway court clearly analyzed partial closing decision-
103. See International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir.
1972). In Garment Workers, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia outlined the
notice requirement for decision-bargaining by stating that "[n]otice, to be effective, must be
given sufficiently in advance of actual implementation of a decision to allow reasonable
scope for bargaining." Id. at 919. The court continued, "Indeed, '[n]o genuine bargaining
... can be conducted where [the] decision has already been made and implemented'." Id.
(quoting Town & Country Mfg., 130 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1036 (1962)). See also Soule Glass &
Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1089 (lst Cir. 1981).
104. See Rabin, supra note 37, at 260.
105. Id.
106. In Brockway, the parties stipulated that the sole issue for the court's determina-
tion was whether or not there was a duty to bargain over an economic partial closing deci-
sion. See Brockway, 582 F.2d at 723, 738-39. Consequently, no specific facts were available
to enter into the Third Circuit's analysis.
In First Nat'l Maintenance, on the other hand, the Supreme Court looked to the
problems which mandatory partial closing decision-bargaining would generally present to
employers. For instance, the Court observed that at times management might require speed,
flexibility, and secrecy in implementing its decision. 452 U.S. at 682. The Supreme Court
also noted that significant tax and securities consequences may hinge on the confidentiality
and timing of the plant closing. Id. at 683. Further, the publicity and delay which bargain-
ing entails could thwart legitimate management intentions. Id. See supra notes 72-89 and
accompanying text (for a full discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis). None of the gen-
eral burdens which Justice Blackmun noted appear to have been actual problems facing
First National Maintenance Corporation. See 452 U.S. at 677; 627 F.2d at 602. Cf. Note,
Enforcing the NLRA: The Need for a Duty to Bargain over Partial Plant Closings, 60 TEX.
L. REv. 279, 293, 309 (1982) (criticizing the Supreme Court in First Nat'l Maintenance for
ignoring the specific facts of the case).
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bargaining in the context of industrial democracy. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit began its analysis by recognizing the
employees' interest in keeping their jobs and by stating that there
is a presumption that decisions which eliminate jobs are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. 07 This analysis is consistent
with the basic tenet of industrial democracy which states that em-
ployees ought to have a voice in decisions which affect their work-
ing lives.10 8 In support of its opinion, the Brockway court cited
sources which advocate labor-management cooperation and indus-
trial democracy. 09
First National Maintenance, on the other hand, resolved the
decision-bargaining question in favor of free enterprise. Thus, the
Court did not adopt the position that termination of employment
creates a presumption of mandatory decision-bargaining. Rather, it
assumed that decision-bargaining is a burden on the employer's
right to freely manage the business. 110 In support of this analysis,
the First National Maintenance Court referred to sources which
advocate granting employers maximum freedom to structure their
businesses."' The Court's primary emphasis on the needs of em-
ployers is best understood by reading the opinion as protecting
free enterprise at the expense of industrial democracy.
The fact that the Third Circuit emphasized industrial democ-
racy over free enterprise and decided that there was a presumption
that a partial closing decision is a mandatory subject of bargaining,
while the Supreme Court preferred free enterprise and found no
duty to decision-bargain, confirms the hypothesis that the objec-
tive burdens imposed by decision-bargaining in the context of spe-
cific cases are not determinative of the final decision reached. In-
stead, the particular court's generalized perception of these
burdens is controlling. The court's perception is, of course, strongly
influenced by its underlying desire to advance either free enter-
prise or industrial democracy. A court that begins with a view to-
107. Brockway, 582 F.2d at 735.
108. Cf. Summers, supra note 12, at 29 (discussing workers' rights under the doctrine of
industrial democracy).
109. The Brockway court cited E. LvaW & F. GOODELL, LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERA-
TION (1948) and C. GOLDEN & H. RUTENBERG, THE DYNAMics OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
(1942). See 582 F.2d at 736 nn.89 & 90.
110. 452 U.S. at 678-79.
111. Justice Blackmun twice cited Comment, supra note 26. See 452 U.S. at 683, 683
n.21.
528 [Vol. 31
1982] FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE 529
ward promoting industrial democracy must necessarily find the
duty to decision-bargain less burdensome than a court which be-
gins with a philosophy favoring free enterprise.112
V. FREE ENTERPRISE AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: CONFLICTING
POLICIES IN LABOR LAW
Framing the problem of decision-bargaining as a choice be-
tween free enterprise and industrial democracy explains why the
courts in Brockway and First National Maintenance perceived the
burdens of decision-bargaining differently and reached opposite
conclusions regarding the desirability of mandatory decision-bar-
gaining. Interpreting section 8(d) with free enterprise as the para-
mount value obviously leads to a different result than an interpre-
tation premised on the advancement of industrial democracy.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of section 8(d) does not con-
tain an express congressional declaration as to which underlying
assumption should govern.11 3 This leaves the NLRB and the courts
112. Compare Brockway, 582 F.2d at 738 ("all [decision-bargaining] would require is
that the two sides discuss the matter at the bargaining table") with First Nat'l Mainte-
nance, 452 U.S. at 678-79 ("Management must be free from the constraints of the bargain-
ing process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business").
113. Congress deliberately left open the parameters of § 8(d). See supra note 4. The
House Minority Report indicated that the primary shortcoming in the rejected shopping list
of mandatory subjects was that it would exclude:
collective bargaining concerning welfare funds, vacation funds, union hiring
halls, union security provisions, apprenticeship qualifications, assignment of
work, check-off provisions, subcontracting of work, and a host of other matters
traditionally the subject matter of collective bargaining in some industries or in
certain regions of the country.
H.R. REP. No. 245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGisLATIW
HIsToRY OF THE: LABOR-MANAGEmENT RELATiONs AcT, at 362 (1948) (Minority Report). The
reference to subcontracting is double-edged. On the one hand, it implies managerial deci-
sions like automation, relocation, and partial closings may be appropriate subjects of
mandatory bargaining. On the other hand, subcontracting is the only managerial decision
mentioned and, as Fibreboard demonstrates, the replacement of employees for outside labor
willing to work for less compensation is often seen as the legally relevant characteristic of
subcontracting. But cf. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966) (no duty to bargain over a subcontracting decision which in-
cluded a partial termination component). The subcontracting decision-bargaining recog-
nized in Fibreboard, therefore, can be seen as necessary to ensure that employees can
successfully bargain for wages and working conditions superior to those which would result
from the natural operation of the labor market. The achievement of better wages and work-
ing conditions is the fundamental purpose of the NLRA. See infra note 116. Bargaining over
economic automation, relocation, or partial closing decisions is not as essential to the
achievement of improved wages and working conditions as is bargaining over Fibreboard
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in the difficult position of having to make political judgments re-
garding the nature of our economic system.114 Moreover, since no
clear legislative guidance exists, a court is certain to be criticized
whether it holds for the union or management on decision-bargain-
ing questions.
115
Despite ambiguities found in federal labor legislation, the Su-
preme Court's decision in favor of managerial freedom in First Na-
tional Maintenance is defensible. Concededly, the collective bar-
gaining process is the primary tool which Congress envisioned to
end industrial strife. The main congressional goal, however, was
that collective bargaining would improve the wages and working
conditions of the American worker.' Requiring mandatory bar-
subcontracting. See infra note 117. Therefore, the former decisions can justifiably be re-
moved from the scope of § 8(d), because mandatory bargaining over these decisions would
be an unnecessary infringement on managerial freedom.
The specific subjects that the House Minority Report indicated might be improperly
excluded by the proposed shopping list of mandatory subjects fall into four general catego-
ries: (1) compensation; (2) assignment of work; (3) job content; and (4) union security. Job
safety is a fifth general category expressly mentioned by Congress. Cf. 93 Cong. Rec. 2010
(1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT, at 867 (1948) ("Collective-bargaining issues would include only wages, hours, and work
requirements; discipline, seniority, and discharge within the bargaining unit; safety, sanita-
tion, and health; and vacations and leaves of absence."). Consideration of the bargaining
subjects expressly mentioned in the legislative history of the LMRA suggests the conclusion
that, although Congress finally incorporated the phrase "other terms and conditions of em-
ployment" into the language of § 8(d), it did not envision that the resulting set of
mandatory subjects would be much larger than compensation, hours, safety, terms at which
the job would be offered, conditions under which the job would be performed, and union
security. Senator Wagner himself lends support to this thesis by his statement:
By substituting the narrower term "working conditions" for the present broader
term "conditions of employment," the bill would narrow the scope of collective
bargaining to exclude many subjects, such as, perhaps pension plans, insurance
funds, which properly belong in the employer-employee relationship ....
93 CONG. REC. 3427 (1947) reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, at 998 (1948).
114. The policy considerations and subjectivity involved in attempting to balance the
respective interests of employers and employees were recognized early in the history of labor
law litigation by Justice Holmes. In Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896),
Justice Holmes stated: "The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and social
advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic and the
general propositions of law which nobody disputes." Id. at 106 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See
also Brockway, 582 F.2d at 722 (for a less cynical version of Justice Holmes' observation).
115. Compare Recent Decisions, supra note 60 (criticizing Brockway) with Gould,
supra note 102 (criticizing First Nat'l Maintenance).
116. The oft-cited Preamble to the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) states:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the
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gaining over management decisions such as partial closings is not
essential for the achievement of this congressional goal.117 In addi-
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead
to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ...
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent bus-
iness depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved [sic] that protection by law of the right of employees
to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impair-
ment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fun-
danmental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differ-
ences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality
of bargaining power between employers and employees.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (emphasis added). There is also legislative history which suggests
that compensation and conditions of the work site were the primary subjects which Con-
gress envisioned when enacting § 8(d). See supra note 113. Note also that the Preamble uses
the more narrow term "working conditions" in lieu of § 8(d)'s "other terms and conditions
of employment." Cf. supra note 113 (for Senator Wagner's perception of the distinction
between "working conditions" and "conditions of employment").
This congressional preoccupation with improving wages and conditions at the job site
indicates to this commentator that perhaps the NLRA ought to be viewed as a remedial
statute designed to foster the development of comfortable wages and working conditions for
the American worker, not the radical restructuring of our economy through the complete
adoption of the doctrine of industrial democracy. But cf. Note, supra note 106, at 300 (The
NLRA's view of industrial self-government seems to have been abandoned in First Nat'l
Maintenance). Concededly, the NLRA does embrace some principles of industrial democ-
racy, e.g., the collective bargaining process. Nevertheless, employee participation in strategic
management decisions, such as partial closings, does not follow from the history and pur-
pose of the NLRA as easily as most commentators suggest. Cf. Note, supra note 106, at 296-
300 (the commentator makes the transition from the express goal of remedying substandard
wages and working conditions to the much broader purpose of "industrial self-government"
without any support from the language and purpose of the Act).
117. This statement is probably the most controversial observation in this Comment,
yet it appears to stand up against the five most common arguments for mandatory decision-
bargaining. The first argument is that the existence of the job is itself a "condition of em-
ployment." Cf. Note, supra note 106, at 300 (employees are vitally interested in decisions
affecting the availability of their jobs). Cf. also text accompanying note 39 (Board's state-
ment of an employee's investment in the job). Fibreboard is often invoked to support this
proposition, because the opinion states that termination of employment "is well within the
literal phrase 'terms and conditions of employment'." See supra text accompanying note 25.
However, Fibreboard cannot be interpreted so broadly. A literal reading of the Fibreboard
Court's statement would mean that every management decision which leads to a reduction
in the number of jobs in an enterprise is a mandatory subject of bargaining, yet the Su-
preme Court in Fibreboard did not even go so far as to require bargaining over every type of
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tion, free enterprise is the traditional foundation of the American
subcontracting decision. See supra note 27. See also NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d
108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). In addition to dubious statutory or
judicial support, the argument that termination of employment itself is a mandatory subject
of bargaining is untenable because industrial employees, according to common law princi-
ples, generally serve at their employer's discretion and do not possess any property interests
or statutory guarantees which require the continued availability of their jobs. See, e.g., Per-
cival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976); Van Der Veer v. Theile, 185
A.D. 17, 172 N.Y.S. 628 (1st Dep't 1918). Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (no prop-
erty interest in job, unless created by contract or statute). But cf. Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (court acknowledges general right to terminate em-
ployee at will, but allows action for bad faith discharge). The NLRA expressly aims to im-
prove the wages and working conditions of employees through the collective bargaining pro-
cess. See supra note 116. The legislative history, however, contains no express modification
of the common law freedom to hire and terminate employees as the business requires. Cf.
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 461, 467 (1st Cir. 1976) (discharge of eight
union supporters for economic reasons was permissible--"The Act was not intended to
guarantee that business decisions be sound, only that they not be the product of antiunion
motivation"). Additionally, all authorities agree that an employer is free to implement an
economic decision which reduces the number of employees required. See First Nat'l Main-
tenance, 452 U.S. at 678 n.17; Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 45; Brockway, 582 F.2d
at 738. Cf. Levine v. C. & W. Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432, 438 (6th Cir. 1979) ("An employer
has no absolute duty to continue in business"). This acknowledged employer freedom ren-
ders both decision-bargaining and the assertion of an interest in the continued availability
of employment meaningless. See infra note 125.
The second common argument is that even if an employee has no vested right to the
continued availability of the job, mandatory decision-bargaining is, nevertheless, necessary
to effectuate the right to bargain for better wages and working conditions. Cf., Gould, supra
note 102, at 18 ("The fact that there is no obligation to bargain to impasse on the decision
may encourage some employers to bluff unions into economic concessions with the threat to
close, knowing that management has no obligation to articulate fully the basis for the deci-
sion."). Concerns that the collective bargaining process will be emasculated are greatly over-
stated. A bluff based on an economic threat to close or relocate would be treated the same
as a bluff based on a plea of inability to pay. In either case, the employer would be required
to open company records and come forward with evidence to substantiate the claim. See
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956). Further, an employer would not
execute the threatened economic partial closing if the venture in question was profitable.
Similarly, the significant planning and investment associated with a relocation make relocat-
ing merely to avoid providing reasonable wages and working conditions irrational, especially
since a substantial probability exists that employees at the new location would organize to
improve intolerable wages and working conditions long before the company could recoup the
costs of relocating. The fact that employers at present do not routinely relocate to reduce
labor costs when the costs associated with notice and effects bargaining and notice and deci-
sion-bargaining are similar supports this proposition. See infra text accompanying notes
163-64. Cf. Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981) (employer
charged with "surface" effects bargaining and implementing its decision prior to impasse).
Note, however, that though the costs associated with effects and decision bargaining are
similar, there are important differences. If the decision itself is a mandatory subject, then
the union could demand control over the decision as part of routine contract negotiations.
See supra notes 3 & 5. Moreover, a strike for a contract clause requiring union consent prior
1982] FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE 533
to implementing the particular management decision would seem to be proper once that
decision has been classified a mandatory subject. Cf. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (Supreme Court refused to enjoin strike for clause
requiring union consent prior to the elimination of any local agent's position). See supra
note 26 for a discussion of Railroad Telegraphers. Cf. also NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l
Union AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960) (the NLRA-LMRA scheme contemplates the par-
ties' use of economic weapons to enforce their bargaining demands). The potential union
control over the decision making process is the primary distinction between effects and deci-
sion-bargaining. See also supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (for further discussion
of the other impediments to managerial freedom which decision-bargaining imposes).
Closing part of the businss or relocating merely to avoid dealing with a union violates §
8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). See Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). See also First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682. Further, a
partial closing or relocation that makes no economic sense would be evidence of an unlawful
discriminatory motive. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). There-
fore, § 8(a)(3) refutes the third common argument for decision-bargaining that the absence
of mandatory bargaining over management decisions like partial closings will adversely ef-
fect the employees' rights to organize.
The above discussion demonstrates that a policy in which decision-bargaining is an ex-
ception and not a presumption will most likely result in neither the destruction of the
NLRA, nor the return of starvation wages and inhuman working conditions. Instead, the
employee representative would merely lose direct control over strategic management deci-
sions and the possibility of decision-bargaining at a point where the economic considerations
prompting management's decision have gained sufficient momentum to turn decision-bar-
gaining into what is essentially effects bargaining. See infra note 125. The desirability of
direct employee involvement in strategic management decisions is, of course, a political
question which has no logically compelled answer. See supra notes 106-15 and accompany-
ing text. In addition to having questionable practical value, last minute decision-bargaining
is unnecessary because, as the Supreme Court in First Natl Maintenance noted, a rational
employer will voluntarily consult the union if reasonable concessions could restore vitality to
a failing business. See 452 U.S. at 682.
The fourth argument for mandatory decision-bargaining is that such a requirement fur-
thers the NLRA's fundamental goal of maintaining "industrial peace." Cf. Note, supra note
106, at 301 ("It is hardly conducive to industrial peace ... that continued employment
itself must be left to the employer's discretion"). The "industrial peace" argument more
closely resembles a slogan than legal analysis. If partial closing decision-bargaining should
be mandatory merely because organized labor strongly desires to participate in these deci-
sions, then any demand on which labor or management insists must also be held mandatory.
Present law, however, holds that the words of § 8(d) are words of limitation. See NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The Borg-Warner mandatory/
permissive dichotomy does not have unquestioned acceptance. See, e.g., Barron, A Theory
of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the Supreme Court's Interpreta-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act, 59 TEx. L. REv. 421, 435-38 (1981). Nevertheless,
Congress has left the Borg-Warner doctrine intact for over 20 years. Since the list of
mandatory subjects is finite, the NLRB and the courts must necessarily disturb "industrial
peace" by placing limits on the bargaining demands of both labor and management. Conse-
quently, the issue becomes which party must be disappointed. Hopefully this Comment
demonstrates that decision-bargaining questions require complicated legislative judgments
on the nature of our economic system and not the mere ipse dixit assertion that mandatory
partial closing decision-bargaining is necessary to promote industrial peace. Additionally,
the NLRA-LMRA scheme clearly contemplates that industrial peace will not be maintained
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economy11 and one of the principal purposes of the National La-
bor Relations Act is to institutionalize labor disputes within the
confines of the capitalist order. 1 9 The right of workers to partici-
pate in the strategic management decisions of their employers is
not a basic tenet of capitalism. The Supreme Court in First Na-
tional Maintenance, by rendering a decision consistent with the
concept of free enterprise, implicitly recognized that Congress, and
not the judiciary or the NLRB, is the proper institution for making
value judgments which change our social structure.120 The NLRB
and the courts should avoid implying drastic socio-economic re-
forms, such as decision-bargaining, into a remedial statute which
never contemplated them.121 Justice Stewart takes this very posi-
tion in his concurring opinion in Fibreboard, which stresses the
uniqueness of the Fibreboard facts. 22
at all times. See Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 489.
Finally, mandatory decision-bargaining advocates assert the simple "why not?" or "what
harm can it do?" Cf. Brockway, 582 F.2d at 738 ("We cannot accept the employer's sugges-
tion that imposing on it a duty to [decision-bargain] would necessarily strip it of its manage-
ment prerogative.. . . Rather, all that such a conclusion would require is that the two sides
discuss the matter at the bargaining table"). The obvious response is that decision-bargain-
ing, as discussed above, does impose burdens on management. See supra notes 99-105 and
accompanying text. Concededly, effects bargaining also imposes burdens on management.
See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. See also Soule Glass & Glazing Co., 652
F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981). The fact that management must bear the burden of effects bar-
gaining, however, cannot serve as sufficient justification for restricting its prerogatives with
mandatory decision-bargaining, or no limit would exist on the amount of inconvenience an
employer could be asked to endure. The line ought to be drawn by considering the degree of
encroachment on entrepreneurial freedom necessary to further the NLRA-LMRA's funda-
mental purpose of improving wages and working conditions through employee organization
for collective bargaining. See supra note 116. The above analysis indicates that mandatory
bargaining on managerial decisions is not a necessary intrusion on managerial freedom.
118. See R. HEI BRONER & L. THunow, EcoNoMIcs EXPLANED 3 (1982); L. HAcKEH, THE
TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN CAPrrALISM 3-15 (1947). See also infra note 122 (Justice Stewart con-
curring in Fibreboard). Cf. Gould, supra note 102, at 7-8 ("Congress had no expectation that
the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the running of the busi-
ness enterprise.... This statement hardly comes as a surprise in this country").
119. See generally W. LEUCHTENBURG, F. D. RoosEvELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963).
120. It is a fundamental constitutional principle that legislative bodies are the proper
institutions to engage in experiments concerning social and economic reforms. See Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963); Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv., Inc. v. Wal-
green Co., 539 F. Supp. 1357, 1369 (W.D. Wise. 1982). Indeed, general delegation of the
authority to determine the appropriate format of the American industrial economy to the
NLRB would most likely be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935).
121. See supra notes 113 & 116.
122. Justice Stewart stated:
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In addition to evidencing proper judicial deference to Congress
in an area where the courts are institutionally ill-suited for deci-
sion making, First National Maintenance is a practical decision
which recognizes the realities of decision-bargaining. 12 3 It is undis-
puted that even under mandatory decision-bargaining the em-
ployer retains the freedom to make the final decision.2 This fact
tends to make the job security offered by decision-bargaining a
mere illusion. A survey by Professor Bernstein indicates that the
mandatory decision-bargaining required by Fibreboard has had
virtually no effect on an employer's subcontracting decisions.1 25 If
I am fully aware that in this era of automation and onrushing technological
change, no problems in the domestic economy are of greater concern than those
involving job security and employment stability.. .. It is possible that in meet-
ing these problems Congress may eventually decide to give organized labor or
government a far heavier hand in controlling what until now have been consid-
ered the prerogatives of private business management. That path would mark a
sharp departure from the traditional principles of a free enterprise economy.
Whether we should follow it is, within constitutional limitations, for Congress to
choose. But it is a path which Congress certainly did not choose when it enacted
the Taft-Hartley Act.
379 U.S. at 225-26 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Northeast Airlines, 536 F.2d 975 (1st Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prods.; 439 F.2d 40
(7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
123. The Supreme Court clearly allowed the practical problems associated with deci-
sion-bargaining to enter into its analysis. See 452 U.S. at 685-86. The majority in Brockway
believed that consideration of the practical problems of decision-bargaining was irrelevant
because the question of whether the right to decision-bargaining exists is analytically sepa-
rate from the right's real-world practicality. See 582 F.2d at 738 n.98. The Brockway major-
ity is correct in the purely logical sense. Nevertheless, avoiding the adoption of an impracti-
cal rule that would merely increase litigation, while failing to significantly advance employee
job security interests, is common sense and common sense is a valid consideration in com-
mon law decision making. Cf. Recent Decisions, supra note 60, at 697 (the Brockway rule is
so uncertain in its application that it renders any exception from the duty to bargain
illusory).
124. See supra note 117.
125. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication - Rule Making Dilemma Under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970). The study stated:
The overwhelming majority (34 of 46 management attorneys whose clients or
organizations had subcontracting problems) of those who answered the last
question about cancellation or modification of subcontracting decisions replied
that bargaining had not caused a modification or abandonment of the decision to
shift work out of the unit. Even more impressive was the certainty and vehe-
mence of many interviewees and questionnaire respondents that the bargaining
requirement has no practical meaning. In typical replies, management lawyers,
for example, characterized the requirement as "a charade; we just go through the
pretense of bargaining. It means more lawyers' fees but it makes no difference in
the end. [M]anagement play-acts. We go through the routine of pretending to let
the union participate in the decision and after hours of taking a lot of guff, we
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decision-bargaining does not protect job security in the subcon-
tracting area, there seems little reason to extend the requirement
to more major management decisions such as partial closing. Board
intervention appears to offer no more than unfair labor practice
charges,12 backpay awards, and other unnecessary impediments to
the execution of managerial decisions which an employer is un-
questionably free to make. The Board cannot mandate union par-
ticipation in strategic management decisions. It can only order de-
cision-bargaining which will most likely occur in an antagonistic
atmosphere and have no practical effect.
VI. THE IMPACT OF FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE
A. The Conceptual Implications of First National Maintenance
First National Maintenance implied that decision-bargaining
questions should be resolved in favor of promoting free enterprise,
not industrial democracy. Accordingly, the Court did not consider
management decisions which cause a reduction in available jobs to
be prima facie mandatory subjects of bargaining. Instead, it re-
garded management's need for "speed, flexibility, and secrecy" as
the key considerations and created a presumption against decision-
bargaining. Justice Blackmun's statement that effects bargaining
will usually provide adequate protection of workers' job security
interests further strengthens this presumption against decision-
bargaining.
First National Maintenance's strong stand against decision-
bargaining and its references to the concurring opinion in
Fibreboard may warrant the adoption of Justice Stewart's narrow
interpretation of Fibreboard. As noted by Justice Stewart: "Ana-
lytically, this case is not far from that which would be presented if
the employer had merely discharged all its employees and replaced
them with other workers willing to do the same job in the same
plant without the various fringe benefits so costly to the com-
pany. ' 127 This interpretation would, for the most part, limit
Fibreboard to its facts. Unionized employees would receive protec-
tion from replacement by local workers willing to work for less
write a carefully drawn letter, going ahead."
Id. at 579-80 (footnote omitted).
126. See, e.g., Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981).
127. 379 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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and, consequently, would be able to bargain for better wages and
working conditions than would naturally result from the competi-
tive forces of the local labor market.'28
B. The Conceptual Implications for Related Managerial Deci-
sions-Automation and Relocation
First National Maintenance suggests that there is no duty to
bargain over the other managerial decisions on which the Court
refused to comment, namely subcontracting (other than
Fibreboard-type situations), automation, and relocation. Currently,
the case law concerning each of these decisions is confused, with
the cases which impose the the duty to decision-bargain adopting
the same expansive interpretation of Fibreboard as did Brock-
way.129 In First National Maintenance, the Court rejected Brock-
128. This result would be in keeping with the primary purpose behind the NLRA. See
sapra notes 113 & 117.
129. The following cases have required decision-bargaining over the managerial deci-
sions which the Supreme Court left open in footnote 22 of First Nat'l Maintenance. See
International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (relocation);
NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1966) (subcontracting). See also
NLRB v. Columbia Tribune Pub. Co., 495 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1974) (automation). But cf.
Metromedia, Inc., KMBC-TV v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1978) (argument that Co-
lumbia Tribune only requires effects bargaining disposed of by stating that the employer
did not meet its effects bargaining obligation).
The authority cited below has found no obligation to bargain over economic relocation,
automation, or subcontracting decisions. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prods., 439 F.2d 40 (6th
Cir. 1971) (no absolute duty to bargain over economic relocation decision when employer
stood ready to negotiate over any and all aspects of the move other than the decision itself).
See also NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961) (no duty to bargain over
economic relocation decision). See Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring) (ref-
erence to automation as an example of a fundamental managerial prerogative). Cf. Opera on
Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941) (strike against automation held
unlawful because it bears no relation to wages, hours, "or any other conditions of employ-
ment"). See NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1011 (1966) (subcontracting case reconsidered in light of Fibreboard).
Current NLRB cases have held that automation, relocation, and subcontracting decisions
are generally mandaory subjects of bargaining. According to the NLRB General Counsel,
however, cases concerning these decisions must now be analyzed in light of the First Nat'l
Maintenance balancing test. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text. Perhaps the
most intriguing NLRB decision in light of First Nat'l Maintenance is National Car Rental
Sys. Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 159 (1980), enf'd in part, 672 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1982). In National
Car Rental, the company opened a new facility at Edison, New Jersey and closed its old
Newark facility after transferring some of its leasing accounts to the Edison facility and
selling the rest to an outside party. While National Car's actions resemble a relocation, the
Board held that the company had no duty to bargain over the decision to initiate the se-
quence of events which led to the closing of the Newark facility. It used an interesting two-
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way's broad interpretation of Fibreboard. Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court appears to have rejected the case-by-case approach
advocated by the Second and Third Circuits in favor of an analysis
of the general nature of the management decision at issue with a
view toward formulating a per se rule for each category of manage-
rial decisions.130 Therefore, other management decisions, such as
subcontracting, automation, and relocation, appear to be properly
analyzed at the level of generality, without regard to the specific
facts of any particular case.
Subcontracting, automation, and relocation all involve the
substitution of machines or nonunion labor for union members.
One commentator advocates decision-bargaining in all cases where
the employer plans to substitute nonunit workers for unit work-
ers.131 Judge Rosenn, dissenting in Brockway, advocated a per se
no-bargaining rule for closings and partial closings. 32 However, he
agreed with the substitution doctrine and believed that subcon-
tracting and relocation decisions should be mandatory subjects of
bargaining.3 3 First National Maintenance implies that the substi-
tution of employees may not be the controlling consideration. The
Court regards management's need for freedom in making signifi-
step analysis to support its conclusion. First, the Board decided there was no duty to bar-
gain over the decision to open the Edison facility, because a resulting adverse effect on the
Newark facility was "far from certain." Id. at 162. Second, there was no duty to bargain over
the decision to sell the bulk of its leasing accounts to a third party and cease operations at
Newark, because such decision was "essentially financial and managerial in nature," involv-
ing a "significant investment or withdrawal of capital" affecting the "scope and ultimate
direction of an enterprise." Id. at 163.
A superficial reading of National Car Rental might lead an employer to attempt to im-
plement a relocation without bargaining over the decision by expanding the business, open-
ing a new, more satisfactory facility, and then making the economic partial closing decision
to eliminate "unexpected" excess capacity without prior decision-bargaining. This attempt
to avoid relocation decision-bargaining through use of National Car Rental would require
the employer to produce convincing evidence that it was not clear when opening the new
facility that an adverse impact on the old facility was likely. A much more important obsta-
cle to using National Car Rental to plan a relocation, however, is the Board's detailed dis-
cussion of the facts of that case. The detailed factual discussion may indicate acceptance of
the NLRB General Counsel's facts-of-the-case approach to relocation, automation, and sub-
contracting decision-bargaining cases developed in light of First Nat'l Maintenance. See
infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 106.
131. See Schwarz, Plant Relocations and Partial Terminations-The Duty to Deci-
sion-Bargain, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 100 (1970).
132. 582 F.2d at 747 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
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cant operational changes as a more important factor than termina-
tion of employment. Moreover, the substitution of employees was
not even the major concern in the Fibreboard opinion. T13 In
Fibreboard, the substitution of employees, the major role of labor
costs in the company's decision, and the absence of a significant
change in operations combined to create the duty to decision-
bargain.
Automation and relocation are operational changes that are
fundamentally different than the subcontracting decision in
Fibreboard. For instance, in automation and relocation, labor costs
are not likely to be as central to the employer's decision as they
were in the Fibreboard subcontracting situation. An employer may
wish to automate to keep in step with the current state of the art
or to take advantage of available tax incentives. A relocation deci-
sion involves consideration of obsolescence or inadequacy of cur-
rent facilities,18 5 the company's current market structure, product
distribution advantages, tax advantages, and the availability of
support facilities, in addition to labor costs. A successful relocation
requires a substantial amount of planning and investment in the
new area.13 Management, therefore, needs a great deal of freedom
to plan and implement a relocation. Automation completely elimi-
nates employee positions and, thus, is more closely analogous to
the terminations resulting from a partial closing than to the substi-
tution occurring in Fibreboard subcontracting.13 7 Similarly, sub-
contracting that results in the employer discontinuing an entire
segment of the business resembles a partial closing and may be
held to be outside the scope of mandatory bargaining without con-
flicting with the job security interest recognized in Fibreboard.3 8
In First National Maintenance, Justice Blackmun stated that
134. If substitution of employees was the controlling consideration in Fibreboard, then
all subcontracting decisions would be prima facie mandatory subjects of bargaining. The
Court, however, expressly stated otherwise. See supra note 27.
135. See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys. Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 159 (1980), enf'd in part, 672
F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1982).
136. For a good description of the planning and effort involved in a relocation, see Gar-
ment Workers, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
137. Justice Stewart cited automation as an example of a managerial prerogative which
is outside the scope of mandatory bargaining. See 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
138. See NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1011 (1966). See also Local 777, Democracy Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1979). But cf. Equitable Gas Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1980) (no duty to
bargain over a subcontracting decision when it has no adverse effect on unit employment).
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effects bargaining is generally adequate protection of workers' job
security interests. Moreover, Fibreboard decision-bargaining has
neither resulted in employers revising their subcontracting deci-
sions, nor provided meaningful protection for employees' jobs.139
Thus, the significant change in operations which automation, relo-
cation, and Adams Dairy subcontracting 140 entail, the unique facts
present in Fibreboard, and the presumption against decision-bar-
gaining established in First National Maintenance should result in
no obligation to bargain over automation or relocation decisions.141
C. The Practical Impact of First National Maintenance
Despite the strong language against decision-bargaining in
First National Maintenance, the opinion does contain abundant
encouragement for supporters of mandatory decision-bargaining.
In footnote 22, the Court expressly refused to intimate any views
on other management decisions, including relocation, sales, auto-
mation, and subcontracting, different than that found in
Fibreboard.142 Moreover, in part B of the opinion, Justice Black-
mun listed the specific facts of the case as "limits" to the Court's
decision.143 Accordingly, the practical impact of First National
Maintenance could conceivably be negligible.
The NLRB general counsel has observed that under the cur-
rent Board interpretation of the law, decisions to automate, relo-
cate, and subcontract are generally mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing. 144 Cases in these areas, however, must now be examined "in
light of the First National Maintenance balancing test. . .[to de-
termine] whether, and to what extent, a particular decision in a
given case involves factors which would make bargaining burden-
some." 145 This inquiry, according to the NLRB general counsel,
should focus on whether the employer's decision hinges on labor
139. See supra note 125.
140. See supra note 138.
141. Cf. Gould, supra note 102, at 16 ("At a minimum, the Court in First National
Maintenance has enunciated a strong presumption against bargaining in the partial closing
and related areas.").
142. 452 U.S. at 686 n.22.
143. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
144. Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum 81-83, July 14, 1981, at 1, reprinted
in 107 LAD. REL. REP. (BNA) 266 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum 81-83].
145. Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum 81-57, Nov. 30, 1981, at 3, reprinted
in 107 LAB. RE.. REP. (BNA) 67 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum 81-57].
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costs or other factors that would be amenable to resolution
through the collective bargaining process. 146 The general counsel
does not read First National Maintenance as mandating a general
inquiry into the interests implicated by automation, relocation,
and subcontracting decisions with a view toward developing per se
rules which provide certainty in each of these areas. Instead, he
has adopted the case-by-case approach developed by the Second
and Third Circuits.147 The general counsel's approach plainly ig-
nores the Supreme Court's emphasis on management's need for
certainty regarding its bargaining obligations 14 1 as wen as the
Court's disdain for the facts-of-the-case approach.149 Under the
general counsel's version of the First National Maintenance bal-
ancing test, an employer who failed to bargain over an automation
or relocation decision could probably defend against an unfair la-
bor practice charge by showing that labor costs were not crucial to
the decision. Success, however, cannot be guaranteed since the
NLRB or, perhaps, a circuit court might find that union conces-
sions could* conceivably have overcome the non-labor considera-
tions which management advances as determinative.8 0 The only
certainty attaching to an economic decision to automate, relocate,
or subcontract is that the decision will come under Board scrutiny.
Further litigation in each of these areas is likely.
NLRB regional offices should ordinarily dismiss cases involv-
ing economic decisions to go partially out of business, according to
146. Id. Other factors that would be amenable to the collective bargaining process are
economic considerations unrelated to labor costs that could be counterbalanced by union
concessions. Id. at 3 n.13. These factors include a raise in rent. Id.
147. See supra notes 48.52 and accompanying text (the Brockway test). See also supra
notes 67-69 and accompanying text (the Second Circuit version of the Brockway test). Con-
cededly, Memorandum 81-57 does not explicitly mention the Brockway test or quote it ver-
batim. This commentator maintains, however, that the difference between a rule which re-
quires decision-bargaining if the facts of the case warrant it (the general counsel's test) and
a rule which requires decision-bargaining unless the facts of the case warrant otherwise (the
Brockway test) is largely semantic. The observation that the two tests have different bur-
dens of proof is not important, because of the difficulty in interpreting and weighing the
facts in decision-bargaining cases. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
148. 452 U.S. at 679.
149. Id. at 684-85. Compare supra note 106 (the Supreme Court's general analysis of
the partial closing decision-bargaining question in First Nat'l Maintenance).
150. See supra note 146. Cf. Brockway, 582 F.2d at 736 ("the union might agree to
changes that would reduce labor expenses and thereby alter the calculation that led to the
employer's determination in the first place.").
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the general counsel."' These types of decisions include partial
closings, discontinuance of product lines, and sales of the busi-
ness,152 but not consolidations.153 The general counsel states, how-
ever, that regional offices should remain vigilant for partial closings
"so markedly different from both the facts and assumptions stated
in First National Maintenance that a different result would be
warranted."1 5' Consequently, while First National Maintenance
has caused great controversy in academic circles,1 55 the decision
most likely will not lay to rest one of the Supreme Court's chief
concerns-providing employers with "some degree of certainty be-
forehand as to when [they] may proceed to reach decisions without
fear of later evaluations labelling [their] conduct an unfair labor
practice. ' 156 As near as can be determined, the state of the law on
decision-bargaining after First National Maintenance appears to
be that an employer: (1) has no duty to bargain over a decision to
go completely out of business;157 (2) must bargain over the decision
to hire independent contractors who would "do the same work
under similar conditions;" ' (3) probably does not have to bargain
over a decision to sell or partially close the business;15 9 (4) might
not have to bargain over automation, relocation, or subcontracting
decisions if labor costs can be shown to be irrelevant to the deci-
sion. 1 0 Clearly First National Maintenance far from settled the
controversies surrounding mandatory decision-bargaining.
151. See Memorandum 81-57, supra note 145, at 4.
152. Id. at 4-5.
153. Memorandum 81-83, supra note 144, at 1. See also Memorandum 81-57, supra
note 145, at 3. A "consolidation," according to the general counsel, is a decision to remain in
the same line of business at one location rather than several. Id. This commentator wonders
whether the definition of "consolidation" may expand to reduce the scope of decisions cov-
ered by First Natl Maintenance.
154. Id. at 4-5 n.19. In First Nat'l Maintenance, 35 employees were discharged as a
result of a $250 management fee dispute. 452 U.S. at 668-70. Since the general counsel's
version of the First Nat'l Maintenance test includes consideration of whether union conces-
sions might possibly alter management's decision (see supra note 146), a case with virtually
the same facts as First Nat'l Maintenance emerging as the exception to its holding is an
irony which is quite conceivable. See Note, supra note 106, at 293.
155. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 102; Note, supra note 106.
156. 452 U.S. at 679.
157. See Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 269.
158. See Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 315.
159. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
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D. The Question of "Meaningful Effects Bargaining"
First National Maintenance may influence future cases con-
cerning the adequacy of effects bargaining.16 ' Justice Blackmun ac-
knowledged the union's right to notice and effects bargaining. 1
2
He also noted, however, that management's need for secrecy and
confidentiality weighed against mandatory decision-bargaining.
Further, "[t]he publicity incident to the normal process of bargain-
ing may injure the possibility of a successful transition or increase
the economic damage to the business."'' 63 Significant advance no-
tice and effects bargaining frustrates the need for secrecy and con-
fidentiality to the same extent as does decision-bargaining. In a sit-
uation where management requires confidentiality and secrecy, no
significant distinction can be drawn between the harm resulting
from the publicity incident to decision-bargaining and the public-
ity incident to effects bargaining.
Presently, there does not appear to be an established notion
regarding how much advance notice is sufficient to provide mean-
ingful effects bargaining. In Royal Plating and Polishing,6 4 the
Third Circuit found that two weeks notice of the plant closing was
inadequate. In Burns Ford, Inc.,"" on the other hand, the NLRB
found one week notice of layoffs to be sufficient.
The amount of advance notice required for meaningful effects
bargaining depends on the facts of the particular case. A union
which has organized several of the employer's facilities should re-
tain enough economic power to engage in meaningful effects bar-
gaining over the closing of one facifity even if it receives no ad-
vance notice. Conversely, where the company's decision will
completely eliminate the bargaining unit, the union will have no
bargaining power if the employer executes the decision without
providing adequate notice.l 6 Therefore, a union which faces elimi-
nation should receive significant advance notice. However, since
First National Maintenance recognizes that an employer may
need confidentiality and secrecy when closing part of his business,
161. For a definition of effects bargaining, see supra note 3.
162. 452 U.S. at 681-82.
163. Id. at 683.
164. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
165. 182 N.L.R.B. 753 (1970).
166. See National Car Rental Sys. Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 159, 164 (1980), enf'd in part, 672
F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1982).
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the need for confidentiality and secrecy should emerge as an argu-
ment against a significant advance notice requirement. 
1 7
CONCLUSION
The Fibreboard Court stated "the words [of section 8(d)]...
plainly cover termination of employment."168 In First National
Maintenance, the Supreme Court explained that this coverage
guarantees bargaining over the effects of a decision leading to ter-
mination of employment, but does not establish a presumption of
mandatory bargaining over the decision itself.
In Fibreboard, mandatory decision-bargaining was easily justi-
fiable. The basic issue was whether an employer could replace em-
ployees with independent contractors who were willing to perform
the same work for lower compensation. The Fibreboard Court sim-
ply determined that an employer should provide the union with an
opportunity to match the savings offered by the independent con-
tractor prior to implementing the decision to replace union em-
ployees with outside labor. This issue is clearly distinct from the
issue of whether employees should participate in decisions con-
cerning where a plant will operate, what equipment it will utilize,
and how long it will remain open.160 Despite the distinction be-
tween decisions concerning the assignment of work within a stable
enterprise and decisions concerning the very structure of an enter-
prise, the Second and Third Circuits were willing to analogize a
167. In Memorandum 81-83, supra note 144, at 4-6, the general counsel reiterated the
Supreme Court's observation in First Nat'l Maintenance that employees have the right to
effects bargaining in a meaningful manner at a meaningful time. He also noted that, in this
regard, early notification of the decision is essential. Id. The general counsel did not, how-
ever, supply any specific notification guidelines.
168. 379 U.S. at 210.
169. See Local 777, Democractic Union Org. Comm. v. N.L.R.B., 603 F.2d 862, 883
(D.C. Cir. 1979) ("The law draws a distinction between those decisions 'primarily about the
conditions of employment' which must be made mandatory subjects of bargaining and those
while affecting the employees' working conditions, are entrepreneurial judgments fundamen-
tal to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise. . .or which substantially alter the way
in which the business is conducted. The latter need not be submitted to bargaining."). Cf.
Comment, supra note 26, at 1095-96 ("A distinction must be drawn between fixed capital
(capital invested in relatively fixed assets like plant and equipment) and working capital
(cash and short-term cash investments .... )... Those labor demands which relate only
to working capital, i.e., wages or pension benefits, need not be excluded from collective bar-
gaining."). Cf. also Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 536 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1976)
("The Act was not intended to guarantee that business decisions be sound, only that they
not be the product of antiunion motivation.").
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partial closing decision to the subcontracting decision in
Fibreboard, solely because both decisions lead to termination of
employment. This analogy resulted from reading Fibreboard as an
endorsement of the basic tenet of industrial democracy that work-
ers ought to have a voice in decisions which significantly affect
their working lives.
The Supreme Court in First National Maintenance, on the
other hand, appeared to proceed from two assumptions. First, that
free enterprise remains the paramount value in our economy. Sec-
ond, that value judgments and reforms regarding the nature of our
social and economic structures are primarily the province of Con-
gress, and not the judiciary or the NLRB. Accordingly, the Court
was unwilling to find adverse impact on employment to be the con-
trolling consideration and to expand the rationale of Fibreboard to
include partial closings. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the
right to effects bargaining was sufficient to comply with the
NLRA's fundamental purpose of improving the wages and working
conditions of the American worker. Since free enterprise has
served as the foundation for the development of American indus-
try, the decision in favor of managerial freedom in First National
Maintenance is understandable in the absence of an express con-
gressional direction to the contrary.170 If our nation truly must
move to embrace the principles of industrial democracy, the move
should be initiated by a majority of our elected representatives,
and not the majority of a court or the NLRB.
17 1
Someday Congress may heed the call from both labor and
management, evaluate the mandatory decision-bargaining ques-
tion, and act. Until that time, however, decision-bargaining contro-
versies will continue to appear before the Board and the courts.
Given the NLRB's current facts-of-the-case approach to resolving
mandatory bargaining claims relating to automation, relocation,
and subcontracting decisions,1 72 and the conflict between this ap-
proach and that of the Supreme Court, First National Mainte-
170. See supra note 122 (Stewart, J. concurring in Fibreboard).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 159 (1980), enfd in part,
672 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1982). See also supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
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nance will most likely not be the last Supreme Court decision-bar-
gaining case.
W. R. GRADL
